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"We will not succumb to politically correctextortion."
-- Gregory G. Little, Associate General Counsel for
Philip Morris Cos.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Tobacco liability cases have evolved greatly over the past several
years. The claims asserted in these cases vary from actions against the
tobacco manufacturers for defective manufacture or design of the product
to claims against retailers and distributors for breach of implied warranty
or negligent distribution. Most recently, however, the war against the
tobacco industry has reached unprecedented heights. While the decisions
in tobacco cases over the past two years seem to volley back and forth
between plaintiff-friendly and industry-friendly rulings much like a tennis
match, the United States government has decided to step in with hopes of
ending the game altogether.
Recently, the U.S. Justice Department filed a lawsuit against major
tobacco companies asking for billions of dollars to recover federal
smoking-related health care costs.2 The complaint alleged that cigarette
companies have conspired since the early 1950s to defraud and mislead the
American public about the effects of smoking.3 Notwithstanding the
similarity between this claim and other previously litigated States' claims,
this lawsuit is the first one of its kind in charging a legal industry with
responsibility for health care costs that have been paid for by the U.S.
government for years.4 The main statutes involved in the lawsuit are the
Federal Medical Care Recovery Act (FMCRA),5 which permits the federal
government to sue to recoup health care costs, and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),6 which allows the
government to force companies to disgorge profits made as a result of
fraud or misrepresentation. While these approaches seem creative and
potentially effective, the U.S. government will have to succeed in proving
the availability and applicability of these statutes to this cause of action.
This will not be an easy task.
This Note addresses why past individual and state claims have
succeeded or failed and what issues make the instant case a difficult one
for the government to win. Part II of this Note briefly describes the

1. Marc Lacey, Tobacco Industry Accused of Fraudin Lawsuit by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 1999, at Al.
2. See Lacey, supra note 1; David S. Cloud & Gordon Fairclough, U.S. Sues Cigarette
Industry in Attempt to Recoup Costs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1999, at Al.
3. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV2496 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 1999).
4. See id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 etseq., infra note 60.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1962, infra note 93.
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evolution of suits against the tobacco industry and the grounds for their
success or failure. Part III offers an analysis of the claims presented by the
federal government in its suit against the tobacco industry. Part IV
addresses the likely affect of the instant case on other suits filed under
similar legal theories.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CLAIM AGAINST TOBACCO
The evolution of tobacco litigation can be credited in part to the
creation of the legal principle of strict liability.7 Design defect and
manufacturing defect, along with failure to warn, are the most prominent
legal theories argued under this approach.' Other claims have been made,
however, under legal theories such as conspiracy, misrepresentation, and
fraudulent concealment.9 This Part explores the various weapons used by
individuals and states in their suits against the tobacco industry and
explains the rationales for their success or failure.
A. Plaintiffs' Causesof Action Against Tobacco
1. Unreasonably Dangerous Product and Failure to Warn
Many of the suits filed by individual smokers against the tobacco
industry have involved claims based on the fact that the tobacco products
caused cancer or some other disease.' ° Specifically, some plaintiffs have
argued that the tobacco products were unreasonably dangerous products
and thus, the manufacturers of those products had a duty to warn of the
inherent dangers."
These assertions are founded on the language of § 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which states in relevant part:
One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user.., is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused.., if the seller is engaged
in the business of selling such a product, and it is expected to
and does reach the user.., without substantial change in its

7. Strict liability was first recognized in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d

897 (Cal. 1963).
8. See AnnaBurdeshaw Fretwell, Note, ClearingtheAir:AnArgumentfora FederalCause
ofAction to ProvideanAdequate Remedyfor Smokers Injuredby Tobacco Companies, 31 GA. L.

REV. 929, 933 (1997).
9. See id.

10. See e.g., Insoliav. Philip Morris Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1032; Gilboy v. American Tobacco
Co., No. 31-8361 (La. 19th DCA 1999); Henley v. Philip Morris, No. 995172 (Cal. 1999).
11. See Insolia, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
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condition. 2
Products have been found to be unreasonably dangerous when a producer
failed to adequately warn of a risk or hazard related to the way the product
was designed.' 3 Under this legal theory, a plaintiff must show that a
reasonable manufacturer would have warned of the product's dangerous
effects, which the manufacturer should have known of at the time the
product reached the consumers. 4 Thus, a claim against the tobacco
industry for the marketing of an unreasonably dangerous product and the
failure to warn of such dangerousness was frequently used, since the only
requisite showing was proof that a reasonable manufacturer would have
warned smokers of those risks which it should have known of at the time
the cigarettes were sold.15
This approach has become somewhat limited, however, by the passage
of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.' 6 The Supreme
Court has since ruled in accordance with this Act and has held that failure

12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (1964).

13. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ONTHE LAW OFTORTS § 99 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
A product is defective as marketed for purposes of finding it unreasonably dangerous for any
of the following three reasons: (1) the presence of a defect in the product that was present in the
product at the time the defendant sold it, (2) the failure by the producer of a product to adequately
warn of a risk or hazard related to the way the product was designed, or (3) the existence of a
defective design. Id. at § 99.
Defects due to failure to warn are recognized in the comments: "In order to prevent the product
from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning...
as to its use." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. j.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15. See PROSSER&KEETON, supra note 13, § 99.
16. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was created in 1965 and was
amended in 1969 by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act. It required the following statement
to be placed conspicuously on all packages of cigarettes: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health." Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat.
87 (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.). 15 U.S.C. § 1331 provides in relevant part:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this Act, to establish a
comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising
with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby- (1) the
public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of cigarette
smoking by inclusion ofwarning notices on each package of cigarettes and in each
advertisement of cigarettes; and (2) commerce and the national economy may be
(A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B)
not impeded by diverse, non-uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and
advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health.
15 U.S.C. § 1331.
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to warn claims are preempted by federal laws requiring standardized
warning labels on all cigarette packages and advertisements. 7 Thus, this
approach has become rather ineffective.
2. Defective Design
Other suits filed by individuals against the tobacco industry involve
the claim that the tobacco product was defectively designed.' 8 The
allegation often made is that the carcinogenic or addictive qualities of the
tobacco products constitute a design defect or that those qualities make the
products bnreasonably dangerous in design. 9 While the products were
made and sold in accordance with their intended design, it is alleged that
the design itself presented an unreasonable risk of harm.2 °
In determining whether a product is defectively designed, courts have
generally adopted one of two tests. 2' The first test is the consumer
expectations test.22 This test is found in the language of section 402A of the
Restatement and states that a product is "unreasonably dangerous" under
section 402A only if the product is dangerous "to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.

23

17. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
18. See PROSSER& KEETON, supra note 13, § 99; see alsosupra note 12 and accompanying
text.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., John W. Wade, On the NatureofStrict Tort LiabilityforProducts,44 MISS. L.J.
825, 830 (1973) (Explaining that the defect in a product may have come about "even though the
product was exactly as it was intended to be, because of a poor design .....
21. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 99.
22. See id.

23.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS

§ 402A, cmt. i. The comments to §402A offer several

examples of what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous." Comment i to § 402A specifically
mentions tobacco products and states:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of the
product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Many products
cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug
necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary
sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as
an instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous"
in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good
whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people
drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey containing a
dangerous amount of fusel oil is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not
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The consumer expectations test can be challenging for plaintiffs in
claims against tobacco companies because of the difficulty of establishing
what reasonable consumers know and understand about the hazards of
smoking. The consumer expectations test was recently applied in Insolia
v. PhilipMorris, Inc. 24 In Insolia,the plaintiffs alleged that the cigarettes
manufactured by the defendants were defective because the average
consumer did not appreciate the health risks associated with smoking or
the addictive nature of nicotine.25 The court emphasized the notion that the
hazardous health effects of smoking did not render cigarettes defective
under the consumer contemplation test since average Americans have had
for many years a common knowledge of the "habit forming nature of
cigarettes."26 Plaintiffs alleged that Americans had been led to believe that
cigarettes were only "habit-forming" as opposed to "addictive," and thus,
the American public did not have a full understanding about the highly
addictive nature of cigarettes. 27 Nonetheless, the court held that the
plaintiffs failed to meet the burden
under the consumer expectations test
28
for their products liability claim.
unreasonably dangerousmerely because the effects of smoking may be harmful;
but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably
dangerous.Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be
the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad
butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.

§ 402A, cmt. i (emphasis added).
24. 53 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1039 (W.D. Wi. 1999).
25. See id. at 1040.
26. Id. (citing Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1996)
("dangers of cigarette smoking have long been known to the community")); see also Roysdon v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988) ('The normal use of cigarettes is
known by ordinary customers to present grave health risks .... "); Tompkins v. American Brands,
Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 895,905 (N.D. Ohio 1998) ("it was common knowledge even in the 1950s that
cigarette smoking was linked to lung cancer... "); Paugh v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 834 F.
Supp. 228, 231 (N.D. Ohio 1993) ("the dangers of smoking.., have been common knowledge").
The court in Insolia emphasized that "all plaintiffs remembered hearing throughout their years as
smokers warnings from various quarters about the risks associated with cigarettes but have
maintained that no amount or type of warning could have persuaded them to stop." Insolia,53 F.
Supp. at 1044-45.
27. Insolia, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1041. Plaintiffs asserted that (1) the industry advertising
countermined all sources of health warnings which resulted in most people failing to heed the
warnings, (2) the public underrated the hazards of smoking and was materially unaware of many
specific risks, (3) the public generally believed that smoking was dangerous but the level of danger
was not widely comprehended, and (4) the public had been deceived by the tobacco companies
because the companies repeatedly denied that cigarettes were dangerous and addictive. See id.
28. See id. at 1043. The court relied on the dissenting opinion in American Tobacco Co. v.
Grinnell,which stated:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

The distinction between addiction and habituation ... mean[s] only one thing to
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The second test often applied in design defect claims is the risk-utility
test.' 9 This test provides for liability if the risks of injury accompanying a
product's use outweigh the utility or social value favoring the continued
availability of the product.30 Under this test, even dangers that were
unforeseeable at the time of design may be included in the analysis.31
However, courts that adopt this test often require that the plaintiff establish
the existence of an alternative design that, if used by the defendant, could
have reduced the risk of harm.3 2 This is a difficult task and often prevents
plaintiffs from succeeding under a defective design claim.
3. Conspiracy and Fraudulent Concealment
Yet another weapon being used against the tobacco industry by
plaintiffs is the claim of conspiracy and fraudulent concealment on the part
of the industry.33 This claim is based on the allegation that the tobacco
industry possessed scientific evidence of the hazardous health risks that
accompany the use of tobacco, and the industry intentionally withheld that
information from consumers.34 Moreover, some plaintiffs have asserted
claims alleging conspiracy among the tobacco companies for the purpose
of keeping damaging evidence from the public.
Some plaintiffs have been successful in alleging that the tobacco
companies made misrepresentations to the public about the dangerous
effects of smoking or that they intentionally concealed information

smokers: it's hard to quit. This is not a new discovery .... Anyone who ever
smoked for any length of time and tried to stop has found it hard; many have
found it impossible. Few understood why, in terms of psychological and
biochemical body processes, but the difficulty was surely no less real merely
because it could not fully be explained.
Insolia,53 F. Supp. 2d at 1042 (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420,441
(Tex. 1997) (Hacht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
29. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 99. "Under this approach, a product is
defective as designed if, but only if, the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the
product." Id.; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding
that collateral benefits of cigarette production, such as employment and generation of tax revenues,
are irrelevant; the only relevant risks and benefits were those to smokers directly).
30. See PROSSER & KEETON, supranote 13, § 99.
31. See PROSSER&KEETON, supra note 13, § 99.
32. See Annotation, Burden of Proving Feasibility of Alternative Safe Design in Products
Liability Action Based on Defective Design, 78 A.L.R. 4th 154, § 3 (1990).
33. See, e.g., Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 80 F.3d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1996); Jones v.
American Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 706,709 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Witherspoon v. Philip Morris,
964 F. Supp. 455,459 (D.D.C. 1997); Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416, 419
(S.D. Fla. 1996); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 916 F. Supp. 1102, 1103 (D. Kan., 1996).
34. See Allgood, 80F.3d at 171.
35. See, e.g., Jones v. American Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 706,710-12 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
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regarding the hazards of cigarette smoking.36 Courts have often, however,
dismissed these claims under the notion that the harms of tobacco were
common knowledge and thus no duty existed on the part of the tobacco
industry to supply such information.37 Moreover, this approach is also
vulnerable to a court's finding that causation can not be established.3"
Conspiracy claims also involve many difficulties in suits by individual
and state plaintiffs. While more and more evidence is emerging about what
information the tobacco industry had and what efforts were taken to
conceal such information,39 plaintiffs are still having a difficult time
establishing sufficient proof for these claims. 40 Furthermore, conspiracy
claims are sometimes found to be reiterations of fraudulent concealment
claims, which also require proof of reliance and causation.41
4. State Claims Against the Tobacco Industry
Even more powerful than suits brought by individuals and classes of
individuals are the recent claims made by States against the tobacco
companies. These state suits often involve claims based on both federal
law42 and state law.43 States often try to recover costs paid for medical
expenses for their residents who suffered from smoking-related diseases
and illnesses.

36. See id. at 721 (holding that plaintiff's did establish sufficient evidence for their fraud and
misrepresentation claims to survive defendants' motion to dismiss).
37. See Allgood, 80 F.3d at 172 (stating that "dangers of cigarette smoking have long been
known to the community"). The common knowledge doctrine has also been used in alcohol cases.
See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385,388 ('Tex. 1991) (explaining that
there is no duty to warn about the dangers ofalcohol because dangers were commonly known to
the public).
38. See Allgood, 80 F.3d at 173 (stating that even if the fraudulent misrepresentation and
concealment claims were not preempted by the Labeling Act, the evidence for the claims was
insufficient as a matter of law since there was no way to prove that plaintiff saw and relied on
defendants' misrepresentations)..
39. See Fretwell, supra note 8.
40. See, e.g., Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
(holding that plaintiffs conspiracy claim failed because the conspiracy claim was based on
negligent acts by defendant and the court stated that defendants cannot conspire to be negligent).
Under a conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must show at least one specific, unlawful, and overt act
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1032,
1044-45. Moreover, a conspiracy claim requires proof of causation and reliance. See id.
41. See Insolia, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1044.
42. Oftentimes, a state's suit involves a federal claim under the Federal Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See infra note 93 and accompanying text. See, e.g., City
& County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
43. State law claims often include claims offraud and misrepresentation or violations ofstate
consumer protection acts or antitrust laws. See City of San Francisco,957 F. Supp. at 1134; see
also State of Washington v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA (Wash. 1996).
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The availability of state-filed causes of action against the tobacco
industry was recently forfeited, however, when the states and the tobacco
company executives signed a national multi-billion dollar settlement to end
litigation by all fifty states. 44 These state suits rely on some of the same
legal and statutory tools as the federal lawsuit and, thus, they will be
discussed in the context of the federal lawsuit in Part I of this Note.
B. The Tobacco Industry'sDefensive Tools
To protect itself from individual claims asserted under various legal
theories including the ones discussed in the prior sections, the tobacco
industry traditionally raises one of two standard defenses: assumption of
risk or contributory negligence.45 These defenses are based on the
plaintiff's conduct and can be very successful in destroying a plaintiff's
ability to recover damages.46
In order to have a successful defense of assumption of the risk, ajury
must find the presence of three elements: (1) plaintiff had knowledge of the
risk, (2) plaintiff had understanding of the risk, and (3) plaintiff freely and
voluntarily chose to proceed with the activity in light of the known risks.47
For contributory negligence, the defendant must establish that, while
defendant violated a duty and would otherwise be liable, the plaintiff was
also at fault and, thus, plaintiffs conduct precludes plaintiff from pursuing
the cause of action.48 The rules of proximate cause apply to an assertion of
the contributory negligence defense.49
Tobacco companies have effectively defended themselves in
individual and state suits by exposing a lack of causation or the presence
of intervening causes.50 The element of causation in tort law requires that
a plaintiff prove that a specific action or set of actions by the defendant led

44. See States UnanimouslyAccept $206 Billion Settlement, But ChallengesArise to Court
Approvals, Mealy's Litigation Reports: Tobacco, Vol. 12; No. 15, Dec. 3, 1998. For further
discussion of the nation-wide settlement between the tobacco companies and the states, see Frank
J. Vandall, Settlement: The Legal Theory and the Visionaries That Led to the Proposed$368.5
Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 473 (1998).
45. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, §§ 65 & 68.
46. See, e.g., Steele v. Brown & Williamson Corp., No. 97-0961 CVW3 (W.D. Mo. May 13,
1999) (finding for defendants, the jury stated that the plaintiffknew what he was doing, knew that
cigarettes were bad, but continued to smoke).
47. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 68.
48. See id. at § 65.
49. See id.
50. See Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., No. 31-8361 (La. 19th DCA 1999) (finding that
past bout with tuberculosis may have been the cause for smoker's illness, therefore plaintiffdid not
sufficiently prove causation); City of San Francisco, 957 F. Supp. at 1137-38 (holding that
plaintiffs failed to meet the causation requirements for the RICO claim and that actions of the
individual smokers were independent, intervening causes of plaintiff's injuries).
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There are two components to causation:

cause-in-fact 52 and proximate cause."3 Thus, plaintiffs in tobacco cases,
whether they be individual smokers or states, must establish a causal link
between the defendant's actions or omissions and the plaintiffs injury.
Lack of causation is the primary reason for the failure of Plaintiff's claims
against tobacco companies, and, as this Note will reveal, lack of causation
may also be the primary reason for the failure of the federal claim.
III. THE UNITED STATES VERSUS THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY

The most recent attempt to defeat the tobacco industry is a suit fied
by the United States Justice Department against several of the tobacco
company giants.54 The main statutes involved in this suit are the FMCRA55
and the civil RICO law. 6 Never before has a legal industry been charged
with responsibility for United States health care costs; thus, this federal
lawsuit presents issues that have never before been addressed. 7 There are
several reasons why this will be an uphill battle for the United States
government to survive what is sure tobe an aggressive movement by the
tobacco industry to have the suit dismissed. If successful, however, this
suit has the power to create the largest assessment of liability against the
tobacco industry to date.5 8 This Part will discuss in turn the two statutorilybased claims and their respective strengths and weaknesses.

51. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, §§ 41-42.
52. This is also known as "but-for" causation. But for the defendant's acts or omissions, the
injury to the plaintiff would not have occurred. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 41.
53. This type ofcausation raises theissue whether the defendant should be legally responsible
for the injury. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 42.
54. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV2496 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 1999).
The suitnames Philip Morris Inc.; Philip Morris Companies; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; American
Tobacco Co.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. Inc.; Liggett and Myers Inc.; The Council for
Tobacco Research U.S.A. Inc.; and the Tobacco Institute Inc. See id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 et seq., infra note 61.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1962, infra note 93.
57. In recent years, many similar actions have arisen where States have brought a direct action
against the tobacco companies to recover medical costs they expended on smokers, and district
courts have upheld the States' right to sue. See, e.g., State ex rel. Norton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 1997 CV-003432 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 2, 1998); State ex rel. Kelley v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.
96-84281-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 28,1997); State ex rel. Humphreyv. Philip Morris, Inc., No. Cl94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 19, 1998); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. S-744-97 CC (Vt. Super.
Ct. Mar. 25, 1998); State v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA, 1996 WL 931316
(Wash. Super. Nov. 19, 1996).
58. Some argue that the potential size of the claim will force the tobacco companies to settle.
"The number will be so large the industry can't pay it... this case is not made to win, it's made to
settle." Cloud, supranote 2, at Al (quoting G. Robert Blakey, Professor, Notre Dame Law School).
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A. The Medical Care Recovery Act: Demanding That

Tobacco Companies Pay Their FairShare
In its recently filed suit against the tobacco industry, the federal
government is hoping to recover health care costs, paid by federal
programs such as Medicare, for injuries suffered by smokers. 59 The suit
relies on the availability of recovery granted the United States under the
FMCRA ° The purpose of FMCRA is to enable the federal government to
recoup some of the millions of dollars it spends for providing medical care
to persons whose injuries are the result of the tortious conduct of a third
party. 61 Nevertheless, this claim raises several issues, the resolution of
which will determine the success or failure of the government's suit
against the tobacco companies. The following subsections discuss some of
the issues that are likely to arise and what the federal government will have
to overcome to win this battle against the tobacco industry.
1. Proving Proximate Causation
In order to recover under FMCRA, the traditional element of causation
under the principles of tort law must be met.62 The statute explains that the

59. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV2496 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 1999).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 et seq. The Federal Medical Recovery Act states in relevant part:
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required by law to
furnish for hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment... to a person
who is injured or suffers a disease, after the effective date of this Act, under
circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person.., to pay damages
therefor, the United states shall have a right to recover from said third person...
the reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished or to be furnished and
shall, as to this right be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured or
diseased person, his guardian, personal representative, estate, dependents, or
survivors has against such third person to the extent of the reasonable value of the
care and treatment so furnished ....
42 U.S.C. § 2651 (a). FMCRA creates a cause of action on behalf of the government for recovery
against a wrongdoer for the reasonable value of the medical treatment furnished to the injured
person to whom the government is required by law to give medical care. See Sanner v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 376 A.2d 180, 182 (1977); see also McCotter v. Smithfield Packing Co., 868
F. Supp. 160, 161 (Ed. Va. 1994); Fanning v. Acromed Corp., 176 FRD 158 (Pa. 1997).
61. See United States v. Trammel, 899 F.2d 1483, 1486 (1990). Furthermore, the Trammel
court explained that the purpose was also to prevent unjust enrichment of victims and tortfeasors
and their insurance companies. See id.
62. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 42. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) states:
The proximate cause of an injury is the primary or moving cause, or that which,
in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the accident could not have happened, if
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person for whom the government provides medical care must be injured or
suffer a disease "under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some
third party." 63 This suggests that the federal government's ability to recover
costs in the suit against the third party tobacco companies is based on the
ability to establish a causal link between the act or omission of the tobacco
companies and the injury to each individual. 64
The issue of proximate cause is one that leads to much disagreement
and confusion, and thus is usually determined "on the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy and
precedent., 65 Since the consequences of an act can go endlessly forward in
time, proximate cause is a judicial tool created to limit a wrongdoer's66
liability only to harms that have a reasonable connection to his actions.
This limits liability by requiring that there be some direct relationship
between the injury asserted and the tortious conduct alleged. 67 Establishing
this direct relationship will be difficult for the government in their suit
against the tobacco industry.
The federal government is claiming that the tortious conduct of the
tobacco companies lies in their failure to disclose the full health risks of
smoking, their attempts to suppress research into safer cigarettes, and their
overall efforts to mislead the public. 68 Therefore, in order to succeed on
this claim, the government will have to establish that the individual
smokers relied on information provided by the tobacco companies and that
their reliance caused them to continue to smoke (or not to quit).
Furthermore, the government will have to show that ultimately, the
reliance on the misinformation caused the smokers injury, which required
medical care.
The tobacco companies in the instant suit will likely offer evidence of
contributory negligence 69 or assumption of the risk.7' As previously
the injury be one which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a natural
consequence of the wrongful act.
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a).
64. See id.
65. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 42 (quoting 1 Street, Foundations of Legal
Liability, 110 (1906)).
66. See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19576, *14 (2d Cir. 1999).
67. See id. at *15 (citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258,268
(1992)).
68. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV2496 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22,
1999).The lawsuit cautiously and perhaps strategically avoids the issue of whether the federal
government was ignorant of the risks of smoking, an issue to be discussed in a subsequent Subpart.
69. See supra notes 48 and 49 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 45 through 47 and accompanying text.
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mentioned, these theories have been effective defensive tools for the
tobacco industry in many prior cases.7 These defenses will likely be
successful in the present suit as well for the same reasons.
2. Aggregation of Claims Under FMCRA
In addition to the difficulty posed by establishing proximate causation
under the statute, there is no mention in FMCRA about the possibility of
aggregating multiple claims. 73 This poses a second impediment for the
government. This type of claim has never been attempted on a nation-wide
level.74
Most suits brought under FMCRA are filed on an individual basis,7 5
thus, it can be said that the federal government should litigate each claim
separately and prove in each individual claim that the tobacco industry's
misconduct proximately caused the individual smoker's injury or illness
which led to the government expenditures. To allow an aggregation of the
claims may result in weaker claims being combined with stronger claims
despite lack of essential proof of the required elements.76 On the other
hand, to require the government to pursue each case individually would be
a practical impossibility, 77 since the government's suit is based on injuries
allegedly caused by the tobacco companies against hundreds of thousands
of individual smokers.78
Moreover, it has been held that state substantive law is the basis for
determining whether tort liability exists for purposes of a claim by the
government under FMCRA. 7 9 The suit filed by the U.S. government
71. See supra notes 50 through 53 and accompanying text.
72. Oftentimes the causation requirement is defeated by the presence ofexigent circumstances
that may also be found to be the actual and direct cause of the injuries suffered by the individual
smokers. See, e.g., Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., No. 31-8361 (La. 19th DCA 1999) (finding
that the fact that plaintiff had been smoking for forty-five years was not sufficient for proving

causation since evidence revealed a past bout with tuberculosis and that might have been what led to
plaintiff's lung cancer). Furthermore, there is no clear evidence to show that if the tobacco companies
had disclosed all the information about the hazards of smoking that the individual smokers would have
quit smoking or that the number of smokers would be less. This could be virtually impossible to prove.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2651 et seq.
74. See Cloud, supra note 2, at Al. But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 1999 Fla.
App. LEXIS 11937 (3d DCA 1999) (holding that the issue of damages, both compensatory and
punitive, may be determined on a class basis).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Trammel, 899 F.2d 1483, 1487 (1990); United States v.
Theriaque, 674 F. Supp. 395,397 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1987).
76. Cf Richard B. Schmitt, StrongerRole Urgedfor Judges in ClassActions, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 1999, atB5.
77. See Cloud, supra note 2.
78. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV2496 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 1999).
79. See Tranmnel, 899 F.2d at 1487.
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involves claims against the tobacco companies for injuries to individual
smokers across the nation.80 Thus, the government should have to file each
claim individually and in the appropriate state instead of filing one massive
claim on a national level.
3. A Legal Industry
What about the fact that the tobacco industry is a legal industry? This
suit represents the first time that a legal industry has been charged with the
responsibility for medical costs paid by the federal government.8 l This
raises an interesting issue relating to the defense of assumption of the
risk.82

As mentioned in Part II, many juries are disinclined to relieve smokers
of the consequences of their own choices.8 3 The tobacco industry relies on
assumption of the risk as an effective defensive weapon against claims
made by smokers under the dangerous product theory. 4 In recent cases

against the tobacco industry, state governments have argued that there was
no assumption of the risk since the risks and dangers of smoking were not
fully disclosed to the American public. 5 It is likely that the federal
government will make the same assertion. The assumption of the risk
argument is a risky one, however, since it can be effectively used against
the state or federal government bringing the suit against the industry.
Since the promulgation of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 6 every box of cigarettes sold in the United States has
been stamped with the requisite warning label stating that the Surgeon
General has determined that smoking is dangerous to the health of the
smoker.8 7 The question that arises, then, is how the states can assert that,
while they authorized the sale of this known dangerous product, the states
did not assume the risk that under their own laws, they would have to pay
for the damages caused when the risk became a reality? 8 It seems that the
states authorized the tobacco companies to sell their products, despite the
fact that the states knew of the potential health risks and required a
warning label on each box of cigarettes, and the state and federal
governments are now suing the tobacco companies for the injuries caused

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
23, 1999,

See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV2496 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 1999).
See Lacey, supra note 1, at A1.
See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Steamfitters v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1331.
See id.
See Robert H. Bork, Tobacco Suit is Latest Abuse of the Rule of Law, WALLST. J., Sept
at B1.
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by those cigarettes sold.89 The premise on which the states' suits are based
is faulty and, thus, the federal government should have no basis for its suit
under the same legal theory.
It is interesting to note that the government continues to benefit greatly
from the sale of cigarettes. 9° While the federal government is going after
the tobacco industry through this suit, it is also intensifying its campaign
to raise taxes on cigarettes. 91 If the federal government's lawsuit is
successful, the government will make money both from the sale and
promotion of cigarettes and from the damages awarded to recover for
medical costs as a result of the sale of cigarettes. The government should
either continue benefitting from the revenue raised by cigarette taxes,
thereby forfeiting any rights it may have to recover damages for medical
costs caused by the sale and consumption of cigarettes, or the government
should seek recovery for medical costs and declare that cigarettes are
illegal. 92 The government should not be able to pursue both.
B. The Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
OrganizationsLaw: Puttingan End to
Forty-Five Years of Intentional
and CoordinatedDeceit
The federal government is also seeking relief under the civil RICO
with hopes of recovering profits allegedly made by the tobacco

law93

89. See id.
90. Taxation on the sale of cigarettes is a primary source of money for state governments.
" he States have made far more money taxing cigarettes than they spend on medical care." Id.
91. See Cloud, supra note 2, at Al. "Accompanying the attack on the industry, the White
House and congressional Democrats are intensifying their campaign to raise cigarette taxes. The
move is being pushed as the solution to a problem of writing a budget for the fiscal year ....Mr.
Clinton's longstanding proposal to raise tobacco taxes by 55 cents a pack would raise a muchneeded $8 billion next year." Id.
92. For a clever discussion of a similar argument involving Florida's use of its Third Party
Liability Act to recover damages while taxing cigarettes at an extremely high rate, see Richard N.
Pearson, The FloridaMedicaid Third-PartyLiabilityAct, 46 FLA. L. REv. 609, 631 (1995).
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1999). The Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
law states in relevant part:
(a)

(c)

It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity... to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce ....
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
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companies as a result of fraud. 94 The government is alleging that the
tobacco industry collaborated to defraud the public.95 As previously
discussed, the federal government will likely encounter a difficult
challenge in its claim under FMCRA due to problems with proximate
cause, aggregation of claims and the legal status of the industry. Similar
issues are raised under the government's claim based on RICO, and most
prevalent among them is the issue of proximate cause. Just as in the
FMCRA claim, the federal government will have to overcome these issues
if it is to be successful in its suit. This Part will expose the issues
present in the government's pursuit of a claim under RICO, and will
attempt to predict the likelihood of success or failure on the government's
part.
1. Proximate Cause and the Holmes Policy Factors
The Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiff's standing to sue under
RICO requires "a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a
'but for' cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well." 96
Furthermore, statutory standing under RICO encompasses common law
principles of proximate cause because Congress implicitly incorporated
those principles into the RICO statute.' As previously mentioned, one of
the tools used to limit a tortfeasor's liability is the requirement of direct
injury.9 8 Just as in the claim under FMCRA, this will be a difficult
requirement for the government for purposes of bringing its claim under
RICO.
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity ....
(d)

It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c)
of this section.

Id. Furthermore, the RICO provision for civil actions states:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of§ 1962
of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee....
Id. § 1964(c).
94. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV2496 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 1999).
95. See id.
96. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection, Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
97. See id. at 267-68 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
532-33 (1983) [hereinafterAGC]).
98. See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19576, *15 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Proximate cause reflects "ideas of what justice demands, or of what
is administratively possible and convenient."99 The U.S. Supreme Court in
Holmes v. Securities Investor ProtectionCorp.,'o identified three policy
factors to guide courts in their application of the general principle that
plaintiffs with indirect injuries lack standing to sue under RICO. 0 1 First,
the more indirect an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to determine
the amount of plaintiff's damages attributable to the wrongdoing as
opposed to other, independent factors." Second, to allow claims to be
brought by indirectly injured parties would require courts to adopt
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at
different levels of injury from the actual tortious acts, in order to avoid the
risk of multiple recoveries. 0 3 Third, when there are directly injured parties
who can remedy the harm on their own account, there is no need to deal
°4
with the problems created in suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely."
An issue that remains unclear is whether all factors are necessary, or if
meeting only one or two will suffice.
In LaborersLocal 17Health & Benefit Fundv. PhilipMorris,Inc.,"5
plaintiffs brought a claim under RICO against several tobacco companies
alleging that the tobacco companies had engaged in advertising and
campaigning designed to mislead the public, and the plaintiffs specifically,
as to the hazards of smoking." Plaintiffs alleged that, due to the tobacco
companies' misrepresentations, the funds failed to implement smoking
cessation programs, which ultimately led to injury to the plaintiffs'
infrastructure and financial stability.'0 7
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the
Holmes policy factors and held that the plaintiffs' allegations of economic
injuries incurred by the funds were purely derivative of the physical
injuries incurred by the participant smokers, and thus were too remote to
permit recovery.10 8 With respect to the first factor, the court found that the
chain of causation was too complicated by third parties from whom
plaintiffs' injuries derive, thus the injuries were indirect." As to the

99. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (citing PROSSER & KEETON § 41).
100. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
101. See id. at 268-69 (citing AGC, 459 U.S. at 540-44).
102. See id. at 269 (citing AGC, 459 U.S. at 542-43).
103. See id. (citing AGC, 459 U.S. at 543-44).
104. See id. (citing AGC, 459 U.S. at 541-42).
105. 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19576, *4 (2nd Cir. 1999).
106. See id. at *7.
107. See id. at *28.
108. See id. at *36.
109. See id. at *31. "It will be impossible for plaintiffs to prove with any certainty: (1) the
effect any smoking cessation programs or incentives would have had on the number of smokers
among the plan beneficiaries; (2) the counter effect that the tobacco companies' direct fraud would
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second policy factor, the court found that the risk of duplicative recovery
did exist since the employers of the smokers could bring suits against the
defendants as tortfeasors." With reference to the third policy factor, the
court found that while the individual smokers were precluded from
bringing claims under RICO, the smokers still had sufficient independent
incentive to pursue their own causes of action for any additional types of
injuries such as pain and suffering.' Therefore, the court found that all the
policy factors supported the conclusion that plaintiffs had failed to
establish2 proximate causation and, thus, did not have standing to sue under
RICO.1
3
Similarly, in City & County of San Franciscov. PhilipMorris,Inc.,'"
a federal claim for violation of RICO, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant
tobacco companies had engaged in a conspiracy to mislead plaintiffs and
their residents about the hazards of smoking. "4 According to plaintiffs, this
led to increased spending by plaintiffs to provide medical care to residents
suffering from diseases caused by smoking." 5 Plaintiffs asserted that the
injuries claimed resulted from the defendants' misrepresentations to and
concealment of information from the plaintiffs and from defendants'
breach of duty" 6 toward the plaintiffs, not solely from the defendants' acts
toward third parties." 7

have had on the smokers, despite the best efforts of the Funds; and (3) other reasons why individual
smokers would continue smoking, even after having been informed of the dangers of smoking and
having been offered smoking cessation programs." Id. at *30.
110. Seeid. at*32-33.
111. See id. at *35-36. "Although these will not be RICO claims, they will remedy the harm
done by defendants' alleged misconduct. Moreover, these actions will promote 'the general interest
in deterring injurious conduct' which Holmes noted as the objective of this policy factor." Id.
(quoting Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection, Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269(1992)).
112. See Laborers, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19576 at *36.
113. 957 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
114. See id. at 1134.
115. See id. Specifically, plaintiffs' claim alleged: (1) violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1342
in that defendants used U.S. mail and wires to engage in schemes to defraud and mislead the public
by suppressing information regarding the hazards of smoking and by making fraudulent
misrepresentations, (2) violation of RICO § 1962(a) due to defendants' use of proceeds of their
racketeering activities to invest in enterprises engaged in racketeering, and (3) violation of RICO
§ 1962(d) in that defendants conspired to violate RICO § 1962(a), (c). See id. at 1136; see also
Fretwell, supra note 8.
116. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants undertook a direct duty to cooperate in protecting the
public health, to assist in researching the effects of tobacco on health, and to disclose accurate
information to the plaintiffs and plaintiffs' residents. See City of San Francisco,957 F. Supp. at
1137.
117. See id. at 1137. Defendants suggested that the plaintiffs were relying on a complex causal
chain to connect defendants' acts to the plaintiffs' alleged damages. See id.The chain described by
the defendants is as follows: (1) defendants made misleading statements regarding the harmful
effects of smoking cigarettes and manipulated the level of nicotine in the cigarettes, (2) as a result,
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The court held that the mere fact that defendants' misrepresentations
were made directly to the plaintiffs did not suffice to meet the causation
requirements under RICO. 8 Furthermore, the court emphasized that the
defendants' alleged violations of duties to the plaintiffs could not be linked
directly to the plaintiffs' increased health care expenses due to the
existence of the essential intervening link of the individual injured
smokers." 9
The court applied the Holmes policy factors and concluded that, (1) it
would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of damages
attributable to the defendants' conduct due to the high number of
alternative factors that could have affected plaintiffs' damages, (2) there
was, however, no risk of multiple recoveries since individual claims for
personal injury are barred under RICO, and (3) since the smokers did not
pay for the medical expenses themselves, the smokers did not have an
incentive to assert their own individual claims. 2 ' While only the first of the
Holmes policy factors was met, the court nonetheless held that the
plaintiffs' injuries did not meet
the proximate cause requirement and
2
dismissed the RICO claims.' '
The arguments likely to be set forth by the government in the instant
case seem similar to those established in City of San Franciscoand in
Laborers, and thus, should lead to the same result. In the instant case, the
government is alleging that the tobacco companies misrepresented the
health risks of smoking, causing individuals to continue smoking or not to
quit smoking, which led to increases in numbers of smokers suffering from
smoking related diseases. According to the federal government, this
increase ultimately led to higher medical expenditures by federal programs
such as Medicare.' 23 In applying the Holmes policy factors to the instant
case, as they were applied in the previous cases, it seems that the damage
claims are highly speculative and that the injury is indirect.' 24 Moreover,

many more of plaintiffs' residents smoked and they smoked for longer periods of time, (3)these
smokers developed health problems from using cigarettes, (4) these residents then sought medical

care from plaintiffs, and (5)plaintiffs spent money to provide health care for these residents. See
id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1138.
121. See id.
122. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV2496 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 1999).
123. The federal suit focuses on recovering costs borne exclusively by federal programs
including programs for veterans and federal workers as well as Medicare, which covers the elderly
and disabled. See Cloud, supra note 2, at Al.

124. As to the first factor, it will be virtually impossible to determine the amount of the
government's damages caused by defendants' actions because of theexistence of other, independent
factors. As to the second factor, there will be no risk of multiple recoveries since, as in City of San
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the directly injured individual smokers have ample avenues through which
they can remedy any harm caused to them. Therefore, the federal
government should have no standing to sue under RICO.
2. Specific Intent to Defraud
The government has stated that the acts and omissions on behalf of the
tobacco companies represent a specific intent to harm the public."5 The
federal government is alleging that the industry collaborated and took steps
to purposefully deceive the American people.'26 Will specific intent
alleviate the requirement of direct injury in the instant case?
This argument has been presented in several RICO cases. 27 For
example, in Laborers,128the plaintiffs averred that even if their claim failed
to meet the direct injury test, they should still have standing to sue because
an exception exists in cases where there is specific intention to harm. 29
Plaintiffs asserted that "where the plaintiff sustains injury from the
defendant's conduct to a third person, it is too remote ... unless the
wrongful act is willful for that purpose.' 30 The court reasoned that that
view had been specifically rejected.' 3' The court held that specific intent
did not overcome the requirement that there be direct injury to maintain an
action under RICO. 3 2 Therefore, the court in the instant case will likely
hold that the specific intent of the defendants as asserted by the
government does not relieve the government of proving direct injury.
Without establishing direct injury, the federal government should not have
standing to sue under RICO.
Francisco,the individual smokers do not have a cause of action to recover medical expenses which
were paid for by the government and further, because individual claims for personal injury are
barred under RICO. See City of San Francisco,957 F. Supp. at 1138. As to the third factor, here
too, as in City of San Francisco,the individual smokers have no incentive to pursue individual
claims since they did not pay for the medical expenses out-of-pocket. See id.
125. See Lacey, supra note 1,at A2.
126. See Cloud, supra note 2, at Al.
127. See, e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19576, at *7 (2d Cir. 1999).
128. See 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19576 at *4.
129. See id. at *36-37.
130. Id. at *37 (quoting I J.G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 55-56
(1883)).
131. See id. at *37. The notion that specific intent alleviated the requirement for direct injury
was specifically rejected in AGC. See id. at *37 (citing AGC, 459 U.S. at 545) (explaining that
"although buttressed by an allegation of intent to harm, the complaint was insufficient. .. for
several reasons, including the fact that the plaintiffs alleged merely indirect injuries and were
therefore barred from recovery as lacking proximate cause); see also Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro
v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 1994)(holding that "nothing... suggests that allegations of
specific intent to cause RICO harm override the necessity to evaluate the directness of injury").
132. See Laborers, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19576 at *39.
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IV.BREATHTAKING CONSEQUENCES
If the federal government is successful in its suit against the tobacco
industry, the decision' s effect will greatly inflate the federal government's
power to control various industries.1 33 The government could use this tactic
to increase regulation in an industry or to gain more revenues from an
industry by threatening a federal suit with potentially devastating liability.
If the damages claimed by the federal government are awarded, the tobacco
companies will likely be unable to pay them, and thus, not be able to
continue their businesses."M Under the FMCRA claim, the government is
seeking to recover government costs amounting to twenty billion dollars
per year for almost ten years of treating smoking-related diseases and
illnesses.135 Furthermore, the claim under RICO could be even more
massive because the statute places no limits on how far back the
government can go in forcing companies to disgorge profits made as a
result of fraud. 136 The combined potential liability will be the highest in
history. Therefore, if successful, the federal government could effectively
destroy the tobacco industry. 37 The tobacco companies have no option but
to settle this suit and perhaps that is just what the federal government is
seeking. 131
Does this suit, then, really represent an effort to use litigation against
an industry for political gain and as a means of getting money to fund
government programs? Perhaps yes. "No business can feel secure in the
United States when the enormous power of the Justice Department can be
unleashed against them for the purpose of raising revenue and scoring
39
political points... this is nothing more than taxation through litigation."'

133. See Bork, supra note 88. "The Justice Department's complaint is only the most recent,
and it will be by no means the last, effort to use litigation to bludgeon private firms in order to
accomplish a prohibition that government could not muster the political support to legislate." Id.
134. The lawsuit claims that the government has spent more than $20 billion a year to treat ill
smokers, and has done so for the past forty-five years during which time the tobacco companies
were deceiving the public about the dangers of smoking. See Cloud, supra note 2. The industry's
liability could potentially exceed the $246 billion settlement reached between the states and the
tobacco industry. See id.
135. See id.; supra note 60 and accompanying text.
136. See Cloud, supra note 2, at Al; 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1999).
137. "Mhe number will be so large the industry can't pay it... this case is not made to win,
it's made to settle." See Cloud, supranote 2, at Al (quoting G. Robert Blakey, Professor at Notre
Dame Law School).
138. See id.
139. See Lacey, supra note 1,at Al. Perhaps the suit is being used to bring about tighter
restrictions on the industry through litigation since Congress has failed to enact legislation that
would do so, thus making political gain the motive. On the other hand, perhaps the suit is being
used to extract much needed money for funding of federal programs or for simply balancing the
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What other industries may find themselves between the government's
cross-hairs? Gun makers have already faced a barrage of state suits and
could be the next victims of a federal suit.14° Some of the arguments
presented in these gun suits, however, are different from those asserted in
the tobacco suits. The city of Chicago, for example, is suing under the
notion of "public nuisance," stating that gun manufacturers were flooding
the city's suburbs with weapons, which created an illicit flow of guns into
the city.' 4 1 Nevertheless, if the RICO and FMCRA claims are successful
in the federal tobacco case, the government could file a similar suit against
the gun industry based on the same legal theories. The federal government
spends billions of dollars a year on injuries caused by guns and, therefore,
could argue that those costs should be recovered. Furthermore, the
government could assert that the gun industry has engaged in a conspiracy
to mislead Americans about the dangers associated with gun possession.
Makers of lead paint have become the most recent targets of state suits
for liability for medical costs. 42 Suits against paint manufacturers are
likely to be a reunion of sorts for some of the most important lawyers
involved in the state tobacco settlements. 143 In a suit filed by Rhode Island,
the state is seeking reimbursement for money spent on the health costs of
sickness and injury caused by lead paint." Furthermore, the state is
alleging that the paint makers promoted the use of lead paint while
covering up the dangers it posed to children. 45 Sound familiar?
budget, resulting in an economic motive. The federal government has subsidized tobacco farmers
for decades, has reaped billions ofdollars in taxes on the sale of cigarettes and has declined to make
tobacco illegal, therefore many question how the government can attack an industry on which they
rely so heavily for revenue. See id.
140. See Fox Butterfield, Results in Tobacco Litigation Spur Cities to File Gun Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at Al; see also Barry Meier, Local GovernmentsAttack Gun Industry With
Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1999, at A16.
141. See Butterfield, supra note 140. The suit demands $433 million to cover police and
hospital costs attributable to handgun violence during the last five years. See id. Claims based on
the unreasonable dangerousness of the guns have also been filed claiming that gun makers failed
to incorporate sufficient safety devices in their weapons. See id.
142. See Milo Geyelin, Former Makers of LeadPaintAre SuedbyRhodelsland,WA.ST.
J., Oct. 13, 1999, at A3; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Rhode Island Sues Makers of Lead Paint, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A18.
143. See Geyelin, supra note 142, at A3; Oppel, supra note 142, at A2.
144. See id. Most sickness suffered due to lead paint occurs in children. See id.
145. See id.; see also Barry Meier & Richard Oppel, Jr., States' Big Suits Against Industry
Bring Battle on Contingency Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at Al. This growing wave of
lawsuits by cities and states against makers of cigarettes, guns, and now lead paint raises
controversial issues about the role of lawyers and the fees they earn in theselegal actions. The trend
is for states and cities to hire lawyers paid on a contingency basis, thus only getting paid if the case
is won or settled. See id. In massive suits such as those against the tobacco and gun industries, a
lawyer's contingency fees are likely to be at least seventeen percent of any verdict or settlement
received. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION

Many a plaintiff has lost his battle against the tobacco industry for
injuries that resulted from the use of tobacco. States have been somewhat
more successful in their endeavor to recover damages from the tobacco
companies for injuries to both their citizens and their states. Is the federal
government the plaintiff who will finally bring the tobacco industry to its
knees? If the government's claims under FMCRA and RICO are
successful, the tobacco industry is sure to suffer an insurmountable loss.
This result could effect the futures of other industries who become
politically and socially unpopular and are forced to pay the piper or forfeit
their businesses. The government should not be permitted to use this tactic.
If the government wants to regulate an industry, it should do so through
legislation, not litigation
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